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SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS: USES,
ABUSES, AND 'SOME PITFALLS
By WILLIAM P. CUNNINGHAM*
The Subchapter S Corporation, a creature of interest to
the owners of small businesses and their lawyers, was born
in 1958 with the enactment of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958,' which added Subchapter S2 to the Internal
Revenue Code. The technical aspects of these new pro-
visions of the Code are complicated; to acquire a workable
understanding of their operation demands considerable
effort. Final Regulations' have recently been issued under
these provisions and a number of comprehensive articles
have been published that would be helpful to those seek-
ing a technical mastery of the area.4 It is not the purpose
of this article to replow this ground. Rather, the objective
is to help the general practitioner faced with making a
decision on the advisability of his client's electing Sub-
chapter S tax treatment. At this juncture, the lawyer
especially needs help (1) in spotting those situations where
the use of Subchapter S would be appropriate, and (2) in
* A.B. 1944, LL.B. 1943. Harvard University; Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law.
'P.L. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stalt. 1650 (September 2, 1958).
'INTExNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (hereinafter called I.R.C.), § § 1371-1377.
'T.D. 6432, Dec. 18, 1959, Regs. 1.1371-1 to 1.1377-3.
4Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election cad
Collapsible Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146 (1958); Comment, Sub-
chapter S: A New Concept in the Tax Status of Business Associations,
44 Cornell L. Q. 560 (1959) ; Comment, Subchapter S Tax Option for Small
Business Corporations, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523 (1959) ; Comment,
Tax Election Corporations: Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 351 (1959); Hoffman, Let's Go Slow with Tax
Option Corporations, 37 Taxes 21 (1959) ; Meyer, One Year of Subchapter 5,
38 Taxes 105 (1960) ; Moore and Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and
Section 1244, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1959) ; Murdoch, Effect of Subchapter S
on Decisions as to Form of Business Organization, 38 Taxes 19 (1,960);
Note, Optional Taxation of Closely held Corporations under the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710 (1959) ; Note, Practitioners'
experience with Subchapter S reveal many doubts, fears; use is limited,
10 J. Taxation 130 (1959); Note, Subchapter S of the 1954 Code, 33 St.
John's L. Rev. 187 (1958) ; Willis, Subchapter S: A Lure to Incorporate
Proprietorships and Partnerships, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 505 (1959) ; Wright
and Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enterprises, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 1131 (1959).
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planning and drafting arrangements among the owners of
a business desiring to operate through a Subchapter S cor-
poration that will tend to minimize potential friction be-
tween the various shareholders that might otherwise de-
velop as a consequence of Subchapter S tax treatment of
the business income.
UsES
When to use a Subchapter S corporation should not be
treated as an isolated problem, for it is one aspect of a
broader problem - determining the best type of business
organization to use in various business situations. Weigh-
ing the tax and non-tax considerations involved in the
choice of a form of business organization has long been
one of the most difficult tasks that lawyers have to handle.
Congress, in enacting Subchapter S, sought to simplify this
task by reducing the importance of the tax factors involved,
through allowing a business in corporate form to elect
approximately the same tax treatment it would have re-
ceived had it been organized as a partnership. The enact-
ment of Subchapter S was desirable, according to the
Senate Committee Report on the bill, ". . . because it per-
mits businesses to select the form of business organization
desired, without the necessity of taking into account major
differences in tax consequences".' This statement has been
called ". . . almost incredibly naive ...",6 for, now, more
than ever, it is necessary to consider tax factors. Before
Subchapter S, the usual choice was between corporation
and partnership. Instead of making corporation and part-
nership equivalent tax-wise, Subchapter S has added a
third alternative, the Subchapter S corporation. Thus, the
task of the lawyer and business advisor has become con-
siderably more complex.7
According to a 1959 report, 62,000 businesses have
already elected Subchapter S tax treatment.' Despite this
evidence of an initial favorable reaction to Subchapter S,
it would seem unwise to assume that Subchapter S will be
5Senate Finance Committee Report No. 1983, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm.
News, 4791, 4876; the Report continued (at 4876) :
"... In this respect, a provision to tax the income at the shareholder.
rather than the corporate, level will complement the provision enacted
in 1954 permitting proprietorships and partnerships to be taxed like
corporations. Also, permitting shareholders to report their propor-
tionate share of the corporate income, in lieu of a corporate tax, will
be a substantial aid to small business."
6 Freeland & Stephens, The Commissioner and the Corporation, 11 Univ.
of Fla. L. Rev. 509, 535 (1958).
1 Moore & Sorlien, supra, n. 4, 457.61959 P-H Federal Taxes, 32,621.
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used on a grand scale. Certainly, the enactment of Sub-
chapter S does not mean that every business that previ-
ously selected partnership for tax reasons will now incor-
porate and elect Subchapter S tax treatment. Nor does it
mean that small corporations will jump at the chance to
elect Subchapter S tax treatment merely because the tax
structure otherwise imposes a "double tax" on corporate
earnings, once at the corporate tax rate, and then again at
the individual rates of the shareholders when such earnings
are distributed as dividends. Subchapter S will have no
appeal for those owners of small businesses who are suc-
cessfully using the corporate form so as to have the busi-
ness earnings taxed at the corporate tax rate in lieu of any
individual tax on the owners, as, for example, where the
corporate earnings are retained in the corporation and used
to finance the growth of the business. In such situations,
the owners will not want to substitute individual tax rates
for the corporate tax rate - the chief effect of a Sub-
chapter S election. Subchapter S should not be sold in
wholesale lots; rather, the choice between partnership,
corporation, and this new alternative, a Subchapter S cor-
poration, turns on the proper assessment of each individual
business situation.
At the outset, the particular business situation must
be examined to determine whether the Code's qualifications
for electing Subchapter S tax treatment can be met. To
govern this question of eligibility, the Code sets out an
elaborate definition of a "small business corporation".' To
be so classified, a business must be a domestic corporation
that does not: (1) own more than 80% of the stock of an-
other corporation," (2) have more than ten shareholders,
(3) have a shareholder (other than an estate) who is not
an individual," (4) have a shareholder who is a non-resi-
dent alien, or (5) have more than one class of stock.'2
Moreover, to retain such classification, a Subchapter S cor-
poration must stay within certain limitations on the type
and source of its income. Not more than 80% of its gross
receipts can be derived from foreign sources nor can more
than 20% of its gross receipts be derived from royalties,
rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and gains from the sale
of securities. 3
9 I.R.C. § 1371(a).
"0This negative characteristic results from the rule that a small business
corporation can not be a member of an affiliated group (as deflned in
I.R.C. § 1504).
11 See Reg. 1.1371-1(e).
12'See Reg. 1.1371-1(g).
1I.R.C. § 1372(e) (4) and (5).
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Even though a business can meet these requirements,
once met they can not be forgotten, for the business will
not be able to keep its Subchapter S tax treatment if, at
some future time, it violates these restrictions. A Sub-
chapter S election entails serious disadvantages because of
the restrictions that these "qualification" rules impose with
respect to the tax and estate planning of the individual
owners and with respect to the operations and investments
of the business itself.
The loss of freedom in estate planning is especially
significant. Testamentary trusts can not be used by the
shareholders since a trust can not be a shareholder of a Sub-
chapter S corporation. Distribution of stock among the
members of a shareholder's family, by will or gift, is ham-
pered because of the rule that there can not be more than
ten shareholders. Some estate plans require an issue of
preferred stock for eventual distribution to non-active
members of a shareholder's family. The Subchapter S cor-
poration, however, can have only common stock. Also, the
voting trust device can not be used with a Subchapter S
corporation.14
A business may find it difficult to keep its dividend, in-
terest, and rent income, plus its gains from security sales,
at less than 20% of its gross receipts. At the least, keeping
constant check on the business operations to make sure
that this limit is not exceeded adds a bothersome detail to
the duties of corporate management. Also, a Subchapter S
corporation is precluded from having any subsidiary, by
reason of the rule that a Subchapter S corporation can not
be a member of an "affiliated group" as defined in I.R.C.
§ 1504." A corporation with a large amount of debt in rela-
tion to the amount of its stock capital may run afoul of the
rule that a Subchapter S corporation can have only one
class of stock. 6
The complicated rules governing the tax treatment of
business income under the Subchapter S election create
various difficulties that should be considered additional
disadvantages of a Subchapter S corporation. For instance,
every adjustment in the Subchapter S tax return for the
corporation, such as a change in its depreciation deduction,
"A choice between freedom in estate planning and, Subchapter S tax
treatment need not be made until a conflict between the two actually
develops. As the business prospers and estate planning becomes a serious
problem, it is likely that the owners (now in higher tax brackets) will
want to terminate the Subchapter S election anyway.
See Reg. 1.1371-1(c).
"See Reg. 1.1371-1(g); Caplin, Subchapter S and its Effect on the
Capitalization of Corporations, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 185 (1950).
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requires a corresponding adjustment in the tax returns of
each individual owner. A partnership has the same prob-
lem, but the inter-relationship between the return of a
Subchapter S corporation and its shareholders is at a higher
level of complexity than that between the returns of a
partnership and its partners. The additional accounting
expense a Subchapter S election entails may be a signifi-
cant item to a small business.
The rule that a shareholder of a Subchapter S corpora-
tion must report as income his share of the corporation's
undistributed taxable income existing on the last day of
the corporation's taxable year presents difficulties in the
case of sales of stock during the year, and inequities when
a shareholder dies during the year. The buyer of stock must
report as his income the whole year's "constructive divi-
dend" no matter how late in the year he made the purchase.
It may be possible to adjust the purchase price of the stock
to compensate the buyer for this extra tax burden, but this
adjustment may be awkward at the least." Similarly, even
though a shareholder dies toward the end of the corpor-
ation's taxable year, his estate must include its propor-
tion of the entire year's earnings in the estate's income
tax return. 8
The Subchapter S corporation, since its distinctive fea-
tures have their origin in the federal law, is unfavorably
treated under most state income tax laws. The Code en-
courages the actual distribution of a Subchapter S cor-
poration's earnings to its shareholders since no additional
tax results therefrom. Yet dividend distributions will mean
extra taxes under many state income tax laws.'" For
example, corporate earnings paid out as salaries to share-
holder-employees are taxed at 3% under the Maryland
income tax, while the same earnings distributed as a divi-
dend would be subject, first, to the 5% Maryland corporate
income tax, and, second, to a 5% Maryland individual in-
come tax.
17 It is also important to withdraw earnings on which the seller has
already paid income taxes, since the right to receive such earnings out of
the corporation without further tax can not be transferred to the buyer.
If a cash shortage makes this unfeasible, the seller might return the
amounts involved to the corporation as a loan.
18Apparently I.R.C. § 691 (Income in Respect of Decedents) does not
apply to such income items; therefore, the estate does not get any deduction
for estate ,tax paid on such amounts under I.R.C. § 691(c). See Anthoine,
Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible
Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1169 (1958).
"Stine, Subchapter S election may increase state income tax on cor-
poration or stockholders, 10 J. Taxation 91 (1959).
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In considering the general disadvantages of electing
Subchapter S tax treatment, the fact that the election can
be abruptly terminated by acts of a single shareholder
creates a sense of uncertainty in the tax picture of all share-
holders. Although such terminations can be guarded against
by proper planning, 20 such plans mean restraints on share-
holders' rights, as well as additional lawyer's fees. The
least tangible, but for many perhaps the most significant,
consideration against making the election lies in a general
fear of the new and unknown, particularly justifiable here
in view of the chance that, sooner or later, Subchapter S
will be repealed."
If a small business can meet the Code's qualifications for
Subchapter S election and the general disadvantages of
such an election, already mentioned, have been considered
and found not too serious, the next step for the tax planner
is to examine the chief features of Subchapter S tax treat-
ment as they apply to his particular situation. The Senate
Finance Committee Report on Subchapter S indicated three
types of business situations in which the use of a Sub-
chapter S corporation could be desirable:
"It will be primarily beneficial to those individuals
who have marginal tax rates below the 52-percent cor-
porate rate (or 30-percent rate* in the case of the
smaller corporations) where the earnings are left in
the business. Where the earnings are distributed (and
are in excess of what may properly be classified as
salary payments), the benefit will extend to indi-
viduals with somewhat higher rates since in this case a
'double' tax is removed. The provision will also be of
substantial benefit to small corporations realizing losses
for a period of years where there is no way of offsetting
these losses against taxable income at the corporate
level, but the shareholders involved have other income
which can be offset against these losses."22
The suggestions of the Committee assume the existence of
a corporation, the question of choice being merely whether
or not to make the election. The possibility of operating
I See text, infra, p. 209 et seg.; Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Sub-
chapter S and Section 1244, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453, 489 (1959), observe that
such shareholder arrangements "When drawn for all possible protection...
become something of a monstrosity" and that the difficulties involved may
constitute a decisive factor against making the election in some situations.
Note, Practitioners' experiences with Subchapter S reveal many doubts,
fears; use is limited, 10 J. Taxation 130 (1959) ; Hoffman, Let's Go Slow
With Tao Option Corporations, 37 Taxes 21, 28 (1959).
2 Senate Report No. 1983, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 4791, 4876.
[VOL. XX
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
the business as a partnership is assumed unavailable as an
alternative. This, of course, will be the case where the busi-
ness is already in existence in corporate form or where
there are compelling non-tax reasons for using a corpora-
tion. In examining the Committee's suggestions, let us
make the same assumption, for eliminating the partnership
alternative simplifies the problem.
As the Committee indicated, the first thing to do is to
make a comparison between the corporate tax rate and the
rates of the individual shareholders. The corporate rate
starts out at 30%, and moves up to 52% for corporate in-
comes over $25,000. This means the average corporate rate
for an annual income of $25,000 or less is 30%; for $50,000,
an average rate of 40%, and for $100,000 an average rate of
46%. An individual will not reach a tax rate over 301% till
his taxable income exceeds $8,000 ($16,000 if he is married
and files a joint return). Perhaps more relevant, the in-
dividual's average tax rate does not exceed 30% till he
reaches roughly $14,000 ($28,000 if a joint return). To take
a concrete example, if A and B own a corporate business
making $20,000 a year, and A and B's only income is the
$10,000 each receives out of the business, a Subchapter S
election would seem desirable.
.But more is involved than merely comparing the cor-
porate rate and the individual rates. The amounts that
shareholders can withdraw from the business in the form
of salary is an important factor. If all the shareholders are
employees of the business and all the corporate earnings
can be taken out as salary, there is no need for a Sub-
chapter S election since the only tax on the business earn-
ings would be the individual income tax - roughly the
same result as is achieved by an election. In fact, there
are some definite advantages in using the salary route
rather than Subchapter S. The chief advantage of the
salary route is that it provides a more flexible tax planning
arrangement. The salary route permits the owners to split
the corporate earnings so that a part is taxed at the cor-
porate rate and the balance (that part withdrawn as
salary) is taxed at the individual rates. Especially as the
individual owners reach the higher tax brackets, a combi-
nation each year of the corporate rate and the individual
rates often provides the optimum over-all tax result.23
The salary route has other advantages, avail-able whether or not a
Subchapter S election is made: (1) Under the Maryland state income tax
there is a 7% differential in favor of withdrawals as salary as compared
with withdrawals as dividends. (2) Withdrawals as salary provide a
higher base for contributions to a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan.
1960]
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On the other hand, even though all the shareholders are
employees, if they want to retain some of the business earn-
ings in the corporation and are in low individual brackets,
a Subchapter S election may be indicated. Referring back
to our example of A and B owning a business with $20,000
annual earnings, if A and B wanted to leave $10,000 each
year in the business and take out as salary only $5,000
apiece, a Subchapter S election would result in a total im-
mediate annual saving of $800 in federal income taxes
(assuming both A and B are married and file joint
returns) .24
Regardless of the relative rates of the corporation and
its shareholders, if the shareholders are not employees
and an appreciable part of the corporate earnings are dis-
tributed as dividends, a Subchapter S election will reduce
federal taxes. For example, a widow, inheriting her hus-
band's interest in a close corporation, will usually favor a
Subchapter S election. That is to say, where corporate
earnings are subject to "double" taxes because distributed
as dividends, the election, by eliminating the corporate tax,
will result in tax savings.
If a business is losing money in its operations, a Sub-
chapter S election will be advantageous. Here, the higher
the individual rates in comparison to the corporate rate,
the greater the advantage of an election will be. Once such
losses exhaust a shareholder's basis for his stock and his
loans to the corporation, however, the election becomes
disadvantageous."
For the successful small business that is growing
steadily and needs to retain its earnings, Subchapter S has
no appeal, at least where the individual rates approximate
the corporate rate. Such shareholders hope to take out the
corporate earnings at capital gain rates through eventual
liquidation of the business or sale of their stock, or perhaps
hope to avoid even the capital gains tax by waiting until
On the other hand, an advantage of the salary route combined with a
Subchapter S election is that the danger of controversy with the Internal
Revenue -Service as to the "reasonableness" of salaries will be greatly
reduced; but see Hoffman, supra, n. 21, 25.
'A The Subchapter S election would eliminate a $3,000 (30% times $10,000)
corporate tax at the expense of $2,200 in individual taxes (roughly a 22%
tax bracket for A and B).
I Once the shareholder's basis is exhausted, any additional losses
are neither deductible currently nor usable in any later year. Reg.
1.1374-1(b) (4). It should also be noted that an existing corporation with
a large net operating loss carryover would be unwise to elect Subchapter S
tax treatment in view of Reg. 1.1374-1(a). See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710,
715 (1959).
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their deaths step up the basis for the stock to its fair
market value.2"
Where it is possible to operate the business as a partner-
ship, there are additional factors to consider and weigh
before deciding to use a Subchapter S corporation. When-
ever a new business is started (assuming that non-tax con-
siderations do not demand the use of a corporation), or
where an existing business is being conducted as a partner-
ship, a tax comparison between partnership and Subchap-
ter S corporation should be made. When a business is
started, some lawyers use an old tax rule of thumb - begin
as a partnership and change to a corporation when the busi-
ness becomes successful. This general rule may have some
validity still, despite the enactment of Subchapter S. That
is, it would be dangerous to incorporate all new businesses
on the theory that should partnership tax treatment turn
out to be preferable a Subchapter S election could then be
made; for there are some important differences tax-wise
between partnerships and Subchapter S corporations. Part-
nership may still be the best form to use in many situations.
And it must be kept in mind that the shift from a partner-
ship to a normal corporation or a Subchapter S corporation
may be made without tax consequences, while a shift in the
opposite direction can be costly tax-wise.2 8
Let us first examine the tax advantages of a Subchapter
S corporation over a partnership. The chief advantage is
that a Subchapter S corporation can confer on shareholder-
employees a number of so-called fringe benefits that are not
available to partners since partners are not considered em-
ployees of the business for tax purposes.29 The most valu-
able of these fringe benefits is a qualified pension or profit-
sharing plan. Such plans have four tax virtues: (1) The
corporation gets an immediate tax deduction for amounts
it puts into the plan. (2) The employee is not taxed until
he receives the benefits. (3) If the employee withdraws his
benefits in a lump sum he can get capital gain treatment.
21 See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 720 (1959).
"IThe chief non-tax advantages of a corporation are usually listed as (1)
limited liability, (2) transferability of shares, and (3) continuity of exist-
ence despite the death of an owner. The answers of partnership partisans
to these alleged advantages are: (1) serious liability risks can be insured
against, (2) stock in a small business from a practical viewpoint is not
readily transferable, at least to outsiders, and (3) by skillful drafting, the
partnership agreement can adequately handle the problems posed by a
partner's death.
28 The shift to a corporation is "tax-free" under I.R.C. § 351, while the
shift to a partnership from a corporation may involve a heavy capital gains
tax under I.R.C. § 331.
2Note, Fringe benefits important factor in considering Subchapter S
election not to be taxed, 9 J. Taxation 376 (1958).
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(4) The pension, or profit-sharing, fund, itself, can accumu-
late its earnings free of tax. In addition, a shareholder-
employee of a Subchapter S corporation can get the tax
benefits of an accident and health plan, which means that
the medical bills of both the employee and his family can
be paid by the business without any tax to the employee.3 °
Similarly, tax-free "sick-pay" (I.R.C. § 105(d)) and meals
and lodgings in kind (I.R.C. § 119) are available to the
shareholder-employee of a Subchapter S corporation. I.R.C.
§ 101(b), excluding from income death benefits paid by an
employer to the deceased employee's family up to $5,000,
can also be exploited by the Subchapter S corporation.31
There are signs that these advantages of a Subchapter S
corporation over a partnership may be too good to last. In
September, 1959, Chairman Mills of the House Ways and
Means Committee introduced a bill that would prevent the
use of all these fringe benefits by Subchapter S corpora-
tions.2 If these fringe benefits are taken away, it is hard to
conceive of any situation where Subchapter S tax treat-
ment would be better than that accorded a partnership.
A less significant advantage of the Subchapter S cor-
poration lies in its ability to adopt as its taxable year a
different period than the taxable years of its shareholders.
Because "constructive dividends" of Subchapter S corpora-
tions are deemed received by shareholders at the end of the
corporation's taxable year, if the shareholders' taxable
years end just before that of the corporation, they can post-
pone paying any tax on the initial earnings of the business
for a period up to 23 months.3 Moreover, different taxable
years allow shareholders to control, to some extent, the
year in which the business earnings will be reportable by
them, since, by actually paying out a dividend, the share-
holders can report the earnings on their tax returns a year
earlier than such earnings otherwise would be reportable. 4
On the other hand, a partnership has some definite tax
advantages over a Subchapter S corporation. Under part-
nership tax treatment, income and deduction items have the
30 Ibid.
Mickey & Wallick, Tax saving plans under Subehapter S now more
reliable as a result of new regulations, 10 J. Taxation 268, 271 (1959).
H. R. 9003, § 2, introduced September 1, 1959, and still in the House
Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 10, passed by the House, and in
the Senate, -also should be watched, since it would extend the advantages
of pension plans to partners and self-employed individuals.
Wright & Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enter-
prises, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, 1145 (1959) ; Note, 10 J. Taxation 130, 133
(1959). § 5 of H. R. 9003 (supra, n. 32), if enacted, would block the use of
different fiscal years in most situations.
81 Mickey & Wallick, supra, n. 31, 269.
[VOL. XX
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
same tax character in the partners' tax returns at they had
in the partnership return. With Subchapter S corporations,
however, the conduit idea has a much more limited appli-
cation. Only long-term capital gains and net operating
losses pass through the Subchapter S corporation without
losing their advantageous tax character. Tax-exempt in-
terest and life insurance proceeds passing to partners from
a partnership retain their tax-exempt quality in the part-
ners' hands, but such items become taxable in the hands of
a Subchapter S corporation's shareholders."
Partners are also treated more favorably under state
income tax laws. For instance, under the Maryland income
tax law, a Subchapter S corporation is not specially treated,
and thus must pay a 5% tax on its earnings. When these
earnings are passed on to its shareholders as dividends, the
shareholders must pay a second 5% tax. In contrast, part-
ners receiving business income pay a single 3% tax. This
7% differential constitutes a significant factor in favor of
partnership over the Subchapter S corporation. Also, under
Maryland law, operating losses of the business are deduc-
tible by partners, but they can not be exploited at all by
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation. As to Social
Security taxes, partners have to pay only three-quarters as
much as do shareholder-employees of a Subchapter S cor-
poration." Where several individuals want to start a busi-
ness and make their capital contributions in the form of
property, it is possible under a partnership agreement to do
equity between the owners and adjust for the differences
between the basis of the property contributed and its cur-
rent market value.3" Such adjustments are not feasible if
the business is organized as a Subchapter S corporation.
There are a number of other minor advantages of the part-
nership over the Subchapter S corporation that may be
significant in particular situations."
85 Reg. 1. 1377-2 (b).
8 For 1960, a partner's self-employment tax rate is 4%%, while the com-
bined rate of a corporate-employer and shareholder-employee is 6%.
Similarly, Maryland and Federal Unemployment Compensation Taxes and
workmen's compensation premiums must be paid with respect to share-
holder-employees by -a corporation while with a partnership such costs
are avoided.
87 See Reg. 1.704-1(c) ; Willis, A Lure to Incorporate Proprietorships and
Partnerships, 0; U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1959).
88Partnerships have various technical advantages over Subchapter S cor-
porations: (1) as to Additional First Year Depreciation (I.R.C. § 179);
(2) as to long-term compensation averaging (I.R.C. § 1301); (3) as to
the use of losses in excess of the owner's basis for his interest (cf. I.R.C.
§ 704(d) and § 1374(c)); and (4) as to the pass through of long-term
capital gain despite the existence of operating loss for the year (see Note,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 719 (1959)). As to the comparison of partnerships
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One conclusion from this detailed comparison of the
partnership, the corporation, and the Subchapter S cor-
poration is inescapable: the enactment of Subchapter S has
not made the job of selecting the best form of doing busi-
ness any easier. Another conclusion is that business situa-
tions in which the Subchapter S corporation clearly should
be used will be comparatively rare.
ABUSES
Although there may be only sporadic use of Subchapter
S corporations as a result of weighing the factors already
suggested, commentators have pointed out numerous oppor-
tunities for abuse of Subchapter S, using "abuse" in the
sense of a use advantageous tax-wise that seems to be con-
trary to the spirit and purpose of the Subchapter as en-
visioned by Congress in enacting it. It is not unlikely that
these abuses, or "gimmick" uses, will result in repeal of the
whole Subchapter. 9 Distinguishing between the legitimate
and the illegitimate in tax planning is often difficult.4" The
newness of this legislation makes it particularly difficult to
draw the line. In any event, for a full picture of Subchapter
S, the lawyer should be aware of the nature and variety of
these potential abuses.
The most frequently mentioned abuse is the so-called
"one-shot election"; that is, electing Subchapter S tax treat-
ment for one or two years and then deliberately revoking
or terminating the election. Such one-shot election may be
advantageous where the business has an usually large capi-
tal gain in prospect. 1 Suppose a mercantile business owns
a building that has greatly appreciated in value. Under
normal corporate taxation, on selling the building the cor-
poration would have to pay a 25% capital gain tax and then,
on distribution of the cash proceeds to its shareholders, the
shareholders would pay an individual tax on the dividend
received. If, however, a Subchapter S elections is made for
the year in which the sale is to occur, at the most a 25%
and Subchapter S corporations in general, see Willis, supra, n. 37, 510;
Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program,
46 Va. L. Rev. 61 (1960).
1Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and
Collapsible Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1175 (1958).
40 The problem may not involve ethics so much as the exercise of sound
judgment (reaching a decision that will prove wise in the long-run). See
generally -Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 Rocky Mountain L. Rev.
412 (1953) ; and Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners, 8 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1952).
4" Roberts & Alpert, Subchapter S: Semantic and procedural traps in its
usc; analysis of dangers, 10 J. Taxation 2 (1959).
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tax is levied; for the long-term capital gain would not be
subject to tax in the corporation and would be taxed at only
capital gain rates on distribution of the cash to the share-
holders." Another one-shot election possibility exists where
a loss year is anticipated; the Subchapter S election is made
for that year so that the shareholders can exploit the oper-
ating loss on their individual returns, and then the election
is terminated the following year. It has also been suggested
that the Subchapter S election can be used (1) to avoid in
certain situations the effect of the "collapsible corporation"
provision,4" and (2) on liquidation of the business as a sub-
stitute for Section 337.44
Subchapter S may be exploited by a one-man business
in questionable ways. For example, a manufacturer's agent,
or a public relations consultant, may decide to do business
as a corporation in order to get the advantages that cor-
porate employers can give to their employees, particularly
pension and profit-sharing plans.45 Also, the Subchapter S
election may be used to get cash out of a one-man corpora-
tion with accumulated earnings and profits, without pay-
ment of an individual tax, by paying a high enough salary
to the owner-employee so as to cause the corporation an
operating loss for the year. Since the Subchapter S share-
holder can deduct the loss from his salary income, he is
only taxed on the difference between the salary and the
loss; thereby getting cash out of the corporation without
tax to the extent of this manufactured loss.46 The Sub-
chapter S provisions may enable an individual to avoid the
If the capital gain on the sale of the building (plus the corporation's
other "investment" income) exceeds 20% of its gross receipts for the year,
the corporation will forfeit its right to Subchapter S tax treatment; see
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5). § 4 of H.R. 9003, supra, n. 32, if enacted, would
severely limit the "usefulness" of this maneuver.
,1 Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1171. § 4 of H.R. 9003, supra, n. 32, if enacted,
would eliminate this "gimmick" use of Subchapter S.
11 Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1173; Note, Unforeseen effects of Subchapter S
are big help in liquidations, other tax planning, 10 J. Taxation 223,
224 (1959).
1 Anthoine, s8upra, n. 39, 1166; Note; Fringe benefit important factor in
considering Subchapter S election not to be taxed, 9 .1. Taxation 376 (1958)
but see Rev-Rul. 57-163, Part 4(a), 57-1 C.B. 128, 139.
"The salary must still be "reasonable", see Reg. 1.162-7 and Reg.
1.1372-1(c) (1) ; if the salary deduction is disallowed, there will be no net
operating loss. See Note, How to use election under new law to save taxes
on small corporations, owners, 9 J. Taxation 263, 264 (1958). It has also
been suggested that a sole proprietor over 65 years old may Incorporate
and exploit the Subchapter S election to avoid the Social Security rule
against working beneficiaries earning over $1,200 a year. See Wright &
Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enterprises, 57 Mich.
L. Rev. 1131, 1168 (1959) ; but see OASI Bureau Letter, 3/6/59, 1A CCH
Uvemployment Insurance Reporter, p. 4185.
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so-called "hobby loss" provision 7 by setting up his hobby
business in a corporate shell, and electing Subchapter S.48
Sometimes where a closely held business has been split
up among several corporations, it may be possible to make
the election for those corporations likely to suffer losses,
and not elect for those corporations whose stock is appreci-
ating in value. The resulting combination of gains at capital
gain rates and losses offsetting ordinary income may be par-
ticularly attractive to high bracket shareholders.49
It has been suggested that a Subchapter S corporation
can be profitably used to shift income within a family group
so as to minimize the total family tax bill.5" To illustrate,
if a father and two sons owned a corporation, the father,
if in higher tax brackets than his sons, would find it advan-
tageous to take a low salary from the corporation and
thereby increase the amount of corporate earnings flowing
to his sons by way of dividends. I.R.C. § 1375 (c) would
appear to block such misuse of a Subchapter S corporation.
This section, however, is limited to readjusting the amounts
taxable to the various shareholder-members of the family
group where artificially low salaries are paid to share-
holder-employees. Suppose the father gave all his stock to
his sons (perhaps retaining control through an irrevocable
proxy to vote the shares) 1 and the father continues to per-
form substantial services for the corporation at a low salary.
The diversion of the father's compensation income to the
sons that occurs in this situation is not covered by I.R.C.
§ 1375 (c).1- A limited shift of income to the sons can be
achieved by giving the sons stock just before the end of the
corporation's taxable year, for then the stock's pro rata
share of the corporation's earnings for the whole year is
taxable to the sons rather than to the father. 3
Combining the Subchapter S election with distributions
of dividends in kind may enable shareholders to realize
gains and get cash out of the corporation without any tax
at all. This "gimmick" is rather involved, and may best be
' I.R.C. § 270.
Note. 10 J. Taxation 133 (1959) ; hut see Reg. 1.1374-2.
4 See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 715 (1959); Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1162.
IoAnthoine, supra, n. 39, 1167.
See Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W. 2d 679 (1947).
See also O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPOPRATIONS: LAW AND PRACTE (1958) §§ 5.36
and 6.15; 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 43(b) (2).
1Note, 9 J. Taxation 263 (1958); Meyer, Subchapter S Corporations,
36 Taxes 919, 924 (1958). The Commissioner might successfully tax the
father, however, on the theory that assignments of compensation will not be
recognized tax-wise, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) ; Rev-Rul.
55-2, 1955-1 C.B. 211.
'3Reg. 1.1373-1 (a).
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explained through using a hypothetical situation. Assume
T sets up a Subchapter S corporation with a $50,000 capital
contribution, assume that the business earns $10,000 a year,
and that it invests $20,000 in stock that pays low dividends
but has high growth potential. Assume further that in a
few years the stock purchased by the corporation appreci-
ates in value to $40,000. If this stock is then distributed to
T as a dividend in kind, the only tax consequence to T is
that the basis of his stock in the Subchapter S corporation
is reduced by $32,000.14 Moreover, T now has a $40,000
basis for the stock distributed to him and thus he can sell
it for $40,000 and will have no gain on the sale. To escape
the individual dividend tax in this situation, the Subchapter
S corporation must have no accumulated earnings and
profits; and a business that starts as a Subchapter S cor-
poration will not usually have any appreciable earnings
and profits because its income is taxed currently to the
shareholders. Thus, the enactment of Subchapter S may
breed new interest and activity in the dividend in
kind area.5
Subchapter S does not seem to be sound legislation. It
may be abused more than it is used; if so, it probably will
not endure as a permanent part of the federal tax structure.
But while it lasts, it is a tool to be used with restraint, and
only after thoughtful consideration of its risks and dis-
advantages and after a careful weighing of the available
alternatives.
SOME PITFALLS To AvoID IN SETTING-UP A
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION.
Once the decision has been made to elect Subchapter S
tax treatment, the lawyer's job has barely begun, for
there remain some pitfalls that should be guarded against
through planning and action at the time of election. The
problems arise mainly because there are numerous acts and
events listed in the Code that will cause abrupt termination
See Reg. 1.1373-1(g) (Example (3)). One-fifth (10,000/50,000) of the
property distribution (% times $40,000 = $8,000) is treated as a distribu-
tion of current earnings, which would be taxed to T anyway under I.R.C.
§ 1373 as a constructive distribution. The balance ($40,000 minus $8,000 =
$32,000) is treated as a reduction in the basis of T's stock in his Subchapter
S corporation under I.R.C. § 301(c) (2). Moreover, if the S corporation sold
this stock itself, rather than distributing it as a dividend in kind, it would
be likely to lose its Subchapter S tax status in view of I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5).
See Wright & Libin, supra, n. 46, 1160.
See generally Mintz and Plumb, Dividends in Kind - The Thunderbolts
and The New Look, 10 Tax L. Rev. 41, 44 (1955).
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of the Subchapter S election. 6 Some of these acts are with-
in the unfettered control of a single shareholder, such as
the transfer of stock owned by him to a trust, partnership,
or corporation, or to an individual who refuses to consent
to Subchapter S tax treatment. A disgruntled minority
shareholder can, by causing the termination of the election,
seriously prejudice the tax situations of the other share-
holders. On such a termination, not only will the majority
lose the tax treatment of the business income that they
prefer, but a termination has a retroactive effect that can
cause considerable loss to the other shareholders. For in-
stance, the shareholders may lose their chance to withdraw
as a return of capital previous years' earnings on which
individual taxes have already been paid. Moreover, when
dividends have been paid over early in the year on the
assumption that Subchapter S treatment will apply to the
year, the unexpected termination of the election will result
in the imposition of a corporation tax in addition to the in-
dividual tax on the business earnings distributed during
the year.5 7 There are also numerous ways in which the
management of the corporation can cause the termination
of the election, providing a fertile source of controversy
between majority and minority interests.
Before detailed planning to meet these problems can
begin, a fundamental policy decision must be made. Are
changes in Subchapter S status to be determined by a
majority of the shareholders, or is unanimous approval of
the shareholders to be required? It is almost axiomatic
that rule by a majority, in most business situations, is the
only practical way to govern corporate affairs. Subchapter
S status, however, is not an issue that affects the well-being
of the corporate entity as such, but it is a question that
directly affects the well-being of each individual share-
holder and the attitude of each shareholder as to Sub-
chapter S status is likely to be determined chiefly by the
individual's income tax bracket. It is unlikely, however,
that the majority shareholders, as the controlling group,
will want Subchapter S decisions to require either unani-
mous shareholder consent, on the one hand, or to be left to
the whim of a single shareholder, on the other. In most
business situations, the majority probably will have enough
power and influence, either formal or informal, to force the
minority shareholders to accept majority rule for Sub-
chapter S questions as well as for ordinary business de-
I.R.C. § 1372(e).
Note, Practitioners' experiences with Subehapter S reveal many doubts,
fears; use is limited, 10 J. Taxation 130, 133 (1959).
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cisions. Certainly a majority would be wise to try to
achieve such an arrangement.
There are some businesses, however, that must be
organized, or already have been established, on the basis
of unanimous consent of the shareholders for all important
decisions, the so-called "incorporated partnership". In such
cases, it is likely that the only feasible way to handle Sub-
chapter S questions will be on the same basis. Also, there
may be situations where a majority-run corporation can
obtain the consent of all to a Subchapter S election only by
agreeing to a rule of unanimity for Subchapter S questions.
If no control arrangements as to Subchapter S ques-
tions are worked out at the time of elections, the control
situation will vary depending on what Subchapter S ques-
tion is in issue; a rule of unanimity will apply to election
and formal revocation while termination of the election
will be within the power of the corporate management and
also within the power of each individual shareholder. Thus,
the tax law breeds a control situation that is not only un-
sound in theory but likely to be chaotic in operation. The
differing tax brackets of the shareholders of a Subchapter
S corporation will often lead them to antagonistic positions
on Subchapter S questions. Therefore, unless a Subchapter
S corporation is so closely held that it is safe to assume that
antagonistic positions among the shareholders will not de-
velop in the future, it is important not to leave the control
situation unresolved, but to adopt some definite control
arrangement for Subchapter S questions.
So that the difficulties involved in devising control
arrangements can be appreciated, the various ways in
which the Subchapter S election can be terminated will be
set out in some detail. There are a number of events caus-
ing termination that are within the absolute control of a
single shareholder. Perhaps the simplest device of all is
for a shareholder to transfer stock to a trust; such a trust
may be a short-term revocable trust that, in reality, may
be little more than a sham.5" Transfer of some stock to a
partnership, or to another corporation, or to an individual
who would constitute the eleventh shareholder of the Sub-
chapter S corporation would also terminate the election.
A method of termination often available involves the trans-
fer of some shares to an individual that the transferor has
ascertained in advance would refuse to consent to a con-
tinuance of the election. The most painful termination
method available to an individual shareholder is to move
" See Reg. 1.1371-1(e) and Reg. 1.1372-4.
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his residence to a foreign country and renounce U. S.
citizenship. 9
In those instances where an act of the individual share-
holder was deliberately done to destroy the Subchapter S
election, the question arises whether the courts will dis-
regard such deliberate act as one made "in bad faith", or
without proper "business purpose", and therefore rule that
the attempted termination of the election was ineffective.
The decision may turn on whether the deliberate act was
the sole idea of a single shareholder against the wishes of
the majority, or whether the act was instigated by the
majority. It seems probable, though, that in either case
such acts will be effective to terminate the election, for the
Code, itself, spells out the "penalty" for termination, 0 i.e.,
the corporation loses its right to Subchapter S treatment
for five years. Moreover, in the Regulations, both types of
termination are covered; the distinction is made between
terminations caused by an individual maverick share-
holder and terminations instigated by shareholders having
a substantial interest. In the latter situation the five year
penalty is imposed while in the former the Commissioner
can shorten the five year penalty period." Since the prob-
lem of deliberate termination is covered so explicitly by
statute, legislative history, and regulations, it is unlikely
that a court would nullify a termination on the general
theory of improper tax motive. After all, Subchapter S is
an optional tax treatment. It seems odd to look on a return
to normal tax treatment as improper tax avoidance. The
Government would seem on firmer ground in attacking an
initial election as beyond the purpose and intent of the
Subchapter than in attacking merely the termination of an
election on such grounds.6 2
In addition to the various deliberate acts of termination,
an individual shareholder can involuntarily cause termi-
nation by dying, followed by the failure of his executor or
administrator to consent to Subchapter S treatment with-
in 30 days after such representative has been appointed.8
This termination possibility presents serious difficulties for
the planner seeking to guard against its occurrence. These
difficulties stem from the fact that normally it will be
59 A "non-resident alien" shareholder would disqualify the corporation;
I.R.C. § 1371(a).
I.R.C. § 1372(f).
Reg. 1.1372-5 (a).
Note, 33 St. John's L. Rev. 187, 207 (1958).
Moreover, the consent can not be filed later than 30 days following
the close of the corporation's taxable year in which the estate became a
shareholder, Reg. 1.1372-3(b).
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against the interest of the estate and its legal representa-
tive to consent to a continuance of the election, since, under
Subchapter S rules, the estate will have to include its share
of the whole year's income of the corporation as a "con-
structive dividend" even though the estate has owned the
stock for only a part of the year.64 A particularly trouble-
some problem arises if a shareholder dies just before the
end of the corporation's taxable year and no legal repre-
sentative is appointed within the period of 30 days follow-
ing the end of the corporation's taxable year. 5
The corporate management has even more ways to
terminate the Subchapter S election than does the indi-
vidual shareholder. One comparatively simple method is
for corporate management to so conduct the corporation's
business that more than 20% of the gross receipts of the
business constitute personal holding company type income,
as defined in the Code and regulations. 6 Rents, dividends,
interest and gains from stock sales are the principal types
of income so classified. Similarly, termination ensues if
more than 80% of the corporation's gross receipts are de-
rived from sources outside the United States.07 Under a
1959 amendment of the Code, the acquisition of 80% or
more of the stock of another corporation will result in
termination of the election." Also, termination results if
the corporation issues a second class of stock.09
In addition to the four methods just described, the cor-
porate management has most of the methods available to
the individual shareholder; that is, it can issue stock or
sell treasury stock to the persons prohibited from owning
"An executor may feel obligated to refuse consent, unless he gets court
approval for such consent (there may not be time for this), or unless the
shareholder in his will has explicitly authorized him to consent, or unless
a shareholders' agreement has imposed on the estate a duty to consent
(see, e.g., the draft agreement, infra, p. 221). Anthoine, Federal Tax
Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amcndment,
58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1169 (1958) ; Hoffman, Let's Go Slow With Tax
Option Corporations, 37 Taxes 21, 22 (1959).
', As a last resort, the person likely to be executor should file a consent
within the time limit in the hope that his subsequent appointment will
retroactively validate his action. Also, under Reg. 1.1372-4(b) (iii), the
district director may excuse the failure to file a timely consent. See also,
Comment, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523, 528 (1959). If heirs of a deceased
shareholder deliberately refuse to take out administration in order to force
the termination of the election in disregard of a contractual obligation to
consent, other shareholders may be able to take out administration and
consent for the estate; see 8 Mo. COD (1957), Art. 93, §§ 34 and 67.
"I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5) and Reg. 1.1372-4(b) (5).
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (4).
"I.R.C. § 1371(a) and § 1372(e) (3) in combination with the amendment
to § 1,504 enacted by P.L. 86-376, § 2(c), effective September 24, 1959.
, I.R.C. § 1371(a) and § 1372(e) (3).
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Subchapter S corporation stock, or to an individual who
refuses to consent to a continuance of the election.
With the numerous ways a Subchapter S election can
be terminated in mind, we can turn to the problems in-
volved in devising control arrangements for determining
Subchapter S questions. As has been indicated, a control
arrangement based on majority rule is the desirable one
for most business situations. At the outset, we run into
the difficulty that a majority control arrangement seems to
run counter to the policy of Subchapter S, in view of its
requirement of unanimous consent of the shareholders for
both election and formal revocation. What was the purpose
behind these Code requirements? At first blush, it may
appear that Congress was concerned with constitutional
difficulties in imposing on individual shareholders taxes on
undistributed corporate business income without their con-
sent. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Sub-
chapter S regulations7" indicate certain shareholders will be
subject to Subchapter S without any consent on their part to
the election and thus provide some indication that constitu-
tional worries were not the reason for the unanimous con-
sent requirement.7' The requirement of unanimous consent
may have been used to facilitate tax administration. Requir-
ing the signature of each shareholder to the election would
avoid the contention by a shareholder that he was unaware
of the election and did not, therefore, realize his duty to
report his share of the corporate business income on his in-
dividual return. On the other hand, Congress may have felt
that the minority shareholders needed the protection given
by this requirement of unanimous consent to prevent im-
position upon them by the majority shareholders. But, even
assuming that the Code's provisions were designed in some
part to protect minority shareholders, it now seems gener-
ally accepted by most courts, at least in corporation law,
that an individual can waive statutory provisions enacted
for his benefit, unless such waiver itself would violate
public policy.72 Therefore, although in all dealings with
Reg. 1.1372-1(b) (2) (N.B. the final sentence of this subsection).
An individual tax on undistributed corporate profits would seem con-
stitutional under Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wallace (79 U.S.) 1, 18 (1870),
where the court held that it is ". . . as competent for Congress to tax
annual gains and profits before they are divided among the holders of the
stock as afterwards .. " See also I.R.C. § 551 (a) where the undistributed
income of a foreign personal holding corporation is taxed directly to United
States shareholders, without any consent on their part.
1 See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958), §§ 5.06
and 5.07. In Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 837,
159 A.L.R. 280 (1945) Conway. J. (dissenting), said: "[shareholders] ...
may by agreement waive or relinquish as between themselves statutory
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the Internal Revenue Service there must be "formal"
unanimity to elect and to revoke Subchapter S tax treat-
ment, there is legal precedent to sustain contractual
arrangements between the shareholders binding them-
selves to act with respect to Subchapter S questions in
accordance with the will of the majority.
In designing such a control arrangement predicated on
majority rule, there are two sources of trouble the ma-
jority will want to neutralize: (1) the power of each indi-
vidual shareholder to sabotage the majority's plan to con-
tinue the Subchapter S election, and (2) the potential lia-
bility of the majority for action on Subchapter S questions
contrary to the best interests of the minority shareholders.
Unless the power of the individual shareholder to termi-
nate the election is checked, a disgruntled minority share-
holder will have a cudgel that can do considerable damage
to the other shareholders and that can be a means of obtain-
ing from the majority unwarranted favors.
The potential liability of the corporate management (or
the majority shareholders) for causing termination of the
Subchapter S election presents particularly difficult prob-
lems. In the first place, this is a new area and what the
attitude of the courts will be is unknown. To illustrate
some of the difficulties, it is convenient to use a hypotheti-
cal situation: A, B, and C incorporate a business, each tak-
ing a third of the stock and, as employees, withdrawing
most of the profits in the form of salary. Then C dies leav-
ing his shares to his widow. In order to pay over business
profits to the widow without having to pay a "double" tax
on the dividend distributions, Subchapter S tax treatment
is elected. The business prospers and the tax brackets of
A and B exceed the corporate tax rate. Moreover, A and B
want to expand the business operations and want to build
up cash resources within the corporation by retaining most
of the business profits. Now, they feel it would be advan-
tageous to terminate the Subchapter S election. The widow
of C disagrees; her individual tax rates are lower than A's
and B's. In addition, the Subchapter S election tends to
result in the distribution of more money as dividends than
otherwise would be true, since the business profits are
taxed whether distributed or not and the shareholders need
cash to pay their individual taxes. Without Subchapter S,
the widow, as a minority shareholder, would have difficulty
in getting dividends out of the corporation. At this point,
rights where such waiver or abandonment is not contrary to the public
interest." In accord, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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A and B decide to cause terminaton of the election, without
the widow's consent, by having the corporation's rent in-
come exceed 20% of its gross receipts, by issuing a second
class of stock, or by any of the numerous other ways the
election can be terminated by corporate action. On such
facts, can the widow successfully maintain an action against
A and B for manipulating corporate action for their ad-
vantage and to the widow's detriment? In the accumulated
earnings tax area, we have a closely analogous situation.
There have been indications that the corporate manage-
ment will be liable to the corporate entity for causing the
corporation to incur the I.R.C. § 531 penalty tax, at least
where the corporate management has deliberately caused
the corporation to incur this penalty tax and the corporate
management has been controlled by shareholders who have
preferred the penalty tax to individual taxes at high rates
on dividend distributions while the minority have pre-
ferred dividend distributions to the penalty tax.73 Simi-
larly, in our hypothetical situation, the widow may assert
that A and B should be held liable to the corporation for
the amount of corporate tax that had to be paid as a result
of A and B's deliberate termination of the Subchapter S
election. Certainly the full corporate tax would be an un-
realistic measure of damages. Termination of the election
has a double aspect; though the corporation incurs the cor-
porate tax, the shareholders are relieved of an individual
tax on undistributed business earnings. Thus, a damage
computation, to be fair, must involve offsetting the de-
creased individual taxes against the increase in corporate
taxes. Developing a sensible measure of damages, or even
a sound theory of liability, in such situations is a hard
task.74 For our present purposes, all that is important is
that suits by minority shareholders against the majority for
either negligent or deliberate termination of the Sub-
71 See Note, Derivative actions arising from payment of penalty taxes
under Section 102, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 394 (1949), and Note. Corporations -
Duties of Directors - Personal Liability of Shareholder-Directors for
Accumulating Earnings Which Led to Subjection of the Corporation to
Section 102 Taxcs, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1058 (1948).
71 Treating this problem as one calling for a derivative suit runs into both
theoretical and practical difficulties. Although the injury arises out of im-
proper corporation action, it is not realistic to look upon the injury as
involving harm to the corporate entity. Only the minority is actually
harmed; moreover, the injury varies as to each minority shareholder de-
pending on his individual tax bracket. Therefore, an individual action by
the minority shareholder (or a class action by the minority shareholders)
against the majority shareholders would seem a more appropriate remedy
than a derivative suit, where the damages are awarded to the corporate
entity. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (Cir. 1947); see
generally, BALLANTINE oN CoRPoRATONS (1946), § 143.
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chapter S election are dangers that the majority should not
lightly dismiss.
Protection against these various dangers can be ob-
tained, most effectively, through use of a shareholders'
agreement. An important part of such an agreement in-
volves restricting the transfer of the corporation's shares.75
Thereby, the majority can obtain protection against the
minority shareholder who seeks to cause termination of
the election by the sale or transfer of his stock. That is,
the restrictions would be used as a means of policing all
proposed transfers. Under a first option type of restriction,
the corporation would exercise its option to buy the shares,
unless it was satisfied that the transfer would not cause
termination. If the proposed transfer involved a sale or
gift to a new shareholder, necessitating consent by such
new shareholder to avoid termination, the corporate man-
agement would insist on getting the consent of the new
shareholder in advance before permitting the transfer to
take place.
Unless the term "shareholder" under the relevant Sub-
chapter S provisions" means "shareholder of record", re-
strictions on transfer, alone, may not be completely effec-
tive as a means of preventing termination of the election
by individual shareholders. If an individual becomes a
"new shareholder" within the provisions of Subchapter S
the day he receives a certificate of stock duly indorsed, it
would seem possible for a determined minority shareholder
to terminate the election despite the agreement's restric-
tions on transfer. True, he would thereby violate the re-
strictions, and equity would come to the aid of the ma-
jority and require a rescission of the transaction, or a trans-
fer to the corporation under the option provision, but the
damage may already have been done. Before the majority
may be aware of the actual transfer of the stock certificate,
or, perhaps, before remedial action could be taken, the 30
day period in which the new shareholder must consent may
have run and the election terminated. Although the Com-
mittee Reports on Subchapter S refer at one point to share-
holders "of record",77 it seems likely that the courts will
' Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 713 (1959) ; Moore and Sorlien, Adventures
in Subchapter S and Section 124, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453, 487 (1959). See, as
to the validity of stock restrictions in general, O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA'TIONS:
LAW AND PRACTCE (1958), Chapter VII.
7 HI.R.C. § 1372(e) (1) and (3) in combination with § 1371(a).
In discussing who must consent to the original election, the phrase
"shareholders of record" is used, Senate Finance Committee Report No.
19&3, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 4791, 4877; but cf. at 5005. See Com-
ment, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523, 527 (1959).
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hold that the actual transfer of the stock certificate, rather
than the recording of the transfer on the corporate books,
is the crucial event.7 8 On the assumption that the actual
transfer of the certificate is controlling, the effectiveness of
the restrictions on transfer may still be preserved by re-
quiring all shareholders to deposit their stock certificates
with an escrow agent. If held in escrow, the certificates
could not be transferred in violation of the provisions of
the shareholders' agreement.79
The time a person becomes a shareholder within the
meaning of Subchapter S may even antedate the transfer
of the stock certificate in some situations where equitable
interests are created. In establishing revocable trusts, for
example, it is frequently provided that the grantor may
retain the stock certificates in his own name instead of
making a formal transfer to himself as trustee.8 ° If such a
disposition of stock is deemed sufficient to create a new
shareholder or shareholders for purposes of Subchapter S,
then stock restrictions, even when coupled with an escrow
arrangement, may prove inadequate. Perhaps a clause in
the shareholders' agreement dating the beneficial interest
of the corporation under its option from the time of any
such trust disposition would successfully meet this prob-
lem. If all the above techniques are used, then there is
some assurance that the majority will be protected from
termination of the election by an individual shareholder,
no matter how the term "shareholder" is finally defined.
" The Senate Committee Report did not use the term "shareholder of
record" in discussing termination of the election, ibid, 5006; nor does the
applicable regulation, Reg. 1.1372-4(b)(1). Moreover, Reg. 1.1371-1(d)
defines shareholder as follows: "Ordinarily, the persons who would have to
include in gross income dividends distributed with respect to the stock of
the corporation are considered to be the shareholders of the corporation."
Even though a corporation may properly pay a dividend to a stockholder
of record despite the fact his certificate of stock has been transferred to
another, as between transferor !and transferee the transferee would be the
one beneficially entitled to the dividend and consequently the one required
to report the dividend for tax purposes (see BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
(1946), § 240). Policy considerations lead to the same conclusion. Unless
the actual beneficial owner of stock, as distinguished from the stockholder
of record, is deemed the "shareholder" for purposes of Subchapter S, the
rules against corporations, partnerships or trusts being shareholders of
Subchapter S corporations could be circumvented merely by neglecting to
have stock transferred on the books of the corporation.
19The escrow agent should not be a trustee, or even loosely called one,
in view of the prohibition against a trust's owning shares of a Subchalter S
corporation, Reg. 1.1371-1(e).
80See generally ScoTT, TILE LAW OF TRUSTS (2nd Ed. 1956), § 32.
SHAT-ruCK and FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK (1953) 445, refers
to the ". . . somewhat common custom of executing the trust and then
waiting until sometime later to round up the property . . ."
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A shareholders' agreement also can establish majority
rule for revocation and re-election of Subchapter S tax
treatment in place of the rule of unanimity set out in the
Code."l Such arrangements do not attempt to alter the
formal requirements of Subchapter S; they merely add a
contractual duty on the part of all the shareholders to
comply with these formal requirements whenever the ma-
jority determines that revocation or re-election is desirable.
The risk that the majority may be held liable to the
minority as a result of corporate action instigated by the
majority resulting in Subchapter S termination can be
minimized by a provision in the shareholders' agreement
specifically releasing the majority from such potential lia-
bility. This is, however, a rather delicate matter. As pre-
viously pointed out, the majority's liability, if any, would
be based on a violation of fiduciary duty. Exculpatory
clauses relieving fiduciaries from their normal liabilities
are looked upon with disfavor by the courts.8 " This attitude
stems from the fact that the exculpatory clause is usually
too broad and, if upheld, would provide a shield for the
fiduciary with respect to acts that never were contemplated
by the parties when they created the fiduciary relationship.
It does not seem too dangerous from a public policy stand-
point to give the majority absolute power, as long as such
power is confined to making decisions on Subchapter S
questions. The shareholders in a closely held corporation
should be able, by contract, to make their own rules as to
their mutual rights and duties, at least in dealing with this
Subchapter S area.83
To indicate the form that a shareholders' agreement
covering the above points might take, a draft of such an
agreement is presented below: 4
AGREEMENT m ade this ............ day of .........................
1960, between Arthur Able, Brian Baker, and Charles
Carr (hereinafter referred to as the Stockholders),
and Green, Inc., a Maryland corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the Corporation).
WHEREAs the Corporation has elected and the Stock-
holders have consented under Section 1372 (a) of the
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (2) and § 1372(f).
SCOTT, op. cit. supra, n. 80, § 222.
"See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958), § 3.66.
" This draft is presented as an aid and not as the answer. Not only will
each situation require its own modifications (integration with existing
agreements will often be necessary) but this Subchapter S area is so new
and many of its problems so novel that one hesitates to suggest that any
specific solution, or draft of an agreement, will work out satisfactorily.
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Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to tax treatment under
the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S);
and
WHEREAS the Stockholders desire that the will of
holders of a majority of the shares of the Corpora-
tion's stock outstanding from time to time should
control matters related to the continuance, termina-
tion, revocation, and re-election of Subchapter S tax
treatment;
Now THERFORE, it is mutually agreed as follows:
1. Simultaneously with the execution of this agree-
ment, all the certificates of the Corporation's stock
owned by the Stockholders shall be deposited with the
Treasurer of the Corporation, as Escrow Agent. Said
Treasurer (and his successors in said office) shall hold
the certificates in accordance with the terms of this
agreement and for the purpose of assuring that this
agreement is performed by all parties hereto. Any
certificates of the Corporation's stock hereafter ac-
quired by parties to this agreement shall be deposited
forthwith with said Treasurer to be held by him as
aforesaid.
2. In the event that any party hereto desires to sell,
transfer, or encumber any part or all of his shares of
the Corporation's stock (including any disposition of
stock, or of an interest in stock, that could cause the
termination of Subchapter S tax treatment),85 he shall
first offer such shares of stock for purchase by the Cor-
poration at the book value86 of such shares as of the
close of the month next preceding such offer, said book
value to be determined by the Board of Directors of
the Corporation. Such determination, including the
method thereof and the matters considered therein,
shall be final and conclusive. If said offer is not ac-
cepted by the Corporation within thirty days of the
"The parenthetical phrase, supplemented 'by the last sentence of this sec-
tion, is designed to protect against termination of the election as a result
of a shareholder's creation of a revocable trust without any actual transfer
of the stock certificates. See sitpra, n. 80.
Generally, the use of "book value" to determine the option price is one
of the worst methods of valuation; see O'NKAL, supra, n. 83, § 7.24. The
use of "book value" will tend to increase the deterrent effect of the agree-
ment, since "book value" is usually less than "fair value". Thus, the use
of "book value" may be justified where the primary purpose of the agree-
ment is to prevent termination of the election.
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receipt thereof, said offeror shall be free to dispose of
said shares of the Corporation's stock as he may desire.
Should any shares be disposed of in violation of this
provision, the equitable interest of the Corporation
under this provision in such shares shall date from the
date of such disposition.87
3. In the event of the death of any party hereto,
the executor or administrator of such party shall exe-
cute a consent to Subchapter S tax treatment in ac-
cordance with and within the time limits provided for
in Subchapter S and the regulations thereunder, and
shall take such further action and execute such other
documents as may be necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses of this agreement. 8
4. In the event that holders of a majority of the
shares of the Corporation's stock then outstanding file
a written notice with the Treasurer of the Corporation
that they desire to revoke Subchapter S tax treatment
pursuant to Section 1372(e) (2) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, each party hereto shall execute such
consents to such revocation and take such further ac-
tion and execute such other documents as may be
necessary to effectuate such revocation.
5. In the event that Subchapter S tax treatment
has been revoked or terminated, and in the further
event that holders of a majority of the shares of the
Corporation's stock then outstanding file a written
notice with the Treasurer of the Corporation that they
desire to re-elect Subchapter S tax treatment, each
party hereto shall execute such consents to such re-
election and take such further action and execute such
other documents as may be necessary to effectuate
such re-election.
6. No party hereto, no director, and no officer of
the Corporation shall be liable in damages or other-
wise, or in any other way be held responsible, for the
termination of Subchapter S tax treatment where such
termination results from action taken (or by reason of
failure to act) by the Corporation and where such ac-
"'This section does not prevent a shareholder from terminating the elec-
tion by becoming a non-resident alien. Normally this possibility can be
safely ignored. It would seem wise to include these restrictions also in the
charter of the corporation; O'NEAL, supra, n. 83, §§ 3.79 and 7.14; see also
2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 4(b) (7).
1 This section should avoid the difficulties discussed, supra, n. 64.
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tion, or non-action, as the case may be, has the ap-
proval of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
7. At any time, by the filing of a written notice
signed by the holders of a majority of the shares of the
Corporation's stock then outstanding with the Trea-
surer of the Corporation, this agreement may be termi-
nated, or any provision of this agreement may be
waived.
8. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of all
parties to this agreement, and the terms "party" or
"parties", as used in this agreement shall include the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and as-
signs of the named parties and the heirs, executors,
and administrators of assigns of such named parties.
All parties bound by this agreement shall execute and
deliver any and all documents necessary to carry out
the purposes of this agreement.8 9
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, the undersigned, have
executed and sealed this agreement.
Accepted:
Treasurer of Green, Inc.,
as Escrow Agent.
As an alternative to a shareholders' agreement, a charter
provision for the redemption of stock may sometimes be
used as a means of discouraging minority shareholders
from terminating the Subchapter S election. Under such a
redemption provision the corporation would be given a
right to redeem shares whenever a transfer of such shares
has caused the termination of the Subchapter S election.
Although a disgruntled shareholder can still terminate the
election, such a provision enables the majority to cause the
immediate redemption of the shares he has transferred,
and thereby puts the majority in a good position to re-elect
the Subchapter S tax treatment for the next year.9 With-
'9 Adequate reference to this agreement should be made on the stock
certificates to make sure that any transferee will be bound by it; see
O'NE.AL, supra, n. 83, § 7.16, and 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 2.3, § 114. Before
allowing any transfer under § 2 of the agreement, the corporation should
require the written consent of the prospective transferee to the Sub-
chapter S election.
10 Under Reg. 1.1372-5 (a), the Commissioner will probably be lenient in
allowing a re-election for the next year where a disgruntled minority share-
holder has caused termination of the election.
[VOL. XX
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
out such a redemption clause, the disgruntled shareholder
(or his transferee) can permanently block any attempt by
the majority to re-elect Subchapter S treatment. More-
over, if the redemption price set in the charter is less than
the current fair value of the shares (which will often be
true if "book value" is used as the redemption price), the
redemption provision will tend to deter minority share-
holders from acts causing termination of the election.
The chief advantage of such a redemption provision
over a shareholders' agreement is that it would be less cum-
bersome to establish and operate. Also, it might be con-
venient to use where a buy-and-sell agreement between the
shareholders has already been established, since the addi-
tion of a charter redemption provision may avoid elaborate
revision of existing agreements. On the other hand, such a
redemption provision provides for a less comprehensive
treatment of the problems involved; specifically, it would
not establish "majority rule" as to formal revocation and
re-election, nor would it explicitly relieve the majority
from potential liability for corporate acts causing termina-
tion of the election. This redemption provision technique
would seem most suitable for use where, because of the par-
ticular circumstances, the majority does not consider the
risks of revolt by individual shareholders serious, and, thus,
are content with half-way measures.
Such a redemption provision can only be used in states
permitting redeemable common stock. In a number of
states, this point is as yet unsettled. 1 As far as Maryland
is concerned, the statute itself explicitly permits redemp-
tion provisions as to common stock. 2 Of course, it is still
too early to be confident that a redemption provision of the
type described (and with such a purpose) will withstand
attack in the courts. Not only is redeemable common some-
what novel in itself, but to use a right of redemption to
provide majority rule for Subchapter S questions is to take
an excursion even further into the unknown. As long as all
shareholders consent to a charter amendment creating such
a redemption provision, and the local corporation law is
not adverse, the chances of judicial approval seem good.93
To illustrate such a redemption provision, a tentative draft
is presented below:
IONiL. 8upra, n. 83, § 7.11.
2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 18(a) (5) and § 32.
" Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E. 2d 850 (1954),
would seem to support such a use of a redemption provision. See Note,
Callable Common Stock, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1240 (1955) ; cf. Case Comment,
Unqualified Redemption of Common Stock: A Question of Public Policy,
50 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 558 (1955).
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ARTICLE ............. Redemption of Common Stock.
In the event that any shares are transferred to a
person who fails to consent to tax treatment under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S) in accord-
ance with and within the time limits provided for in
Subchapter S and the regulations thereunder; or, with
respect to shares owned by the estate of any deceased
shareholder, in the event that Subchapter S tax treat-
ment is not consented to by an executor or administra-
tor of such estate in accordance with and within the
time limits provided for in Subchapter S and the regu-
lations thereunder;94 or, in the event that any shares
are transferred or any interest in shares is disposed of
in such a way as to cause the termination of Sub-
chapter S tax treatment; then, any or all of such shares
referred to above as may be designated by the Board of
Directors may be called by the Board of Directors in
such manner as they determine at their book value,
as determined by the Board of Directors as of the close
of the month next preceding such call. Such determi-
nation of book value, including the method thereof
and the matters considered therein, shall be final and
conclusive.95
Could a redemption provision be used, also, as a means
of forcing recalcitrant shareholders to consent to the origi-
nal election of Subchapter S tax treatment? This is an in-
triguing possibility, for, otherwise, there seems no way to
elect Subchapter S treatment over the objection of even a
single shareholder. A corporate charter is usually amend-
able by two-thirds of the shareholders. If such two-thirds
could amend the charter to include a redemption provision
permitting redemption of the stock of anyone who refused
to consent to a Subchapter S election,97 there would be a
method to force the election on the minority. What can be
accomplished through charter amendment varies from
state to state. The Maryland law gives a virtually un-
limited power of amendment to the shareholders. 98 But
4 The shares owned by the estate would be subject to redemption where
no executor ,or administrator has been appointed in time as well as where
an executor or administrator refuses to consent.
11 Cf. draft set out in O'NAL, supra, n. 83, § 10.14(2).
"2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 11(c) (3).
0The redemption clause draft, supra, would have to be modified to make
refusal to consent to the election an additional ground for redemption.
"2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 10. See BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE (1953), §§ 115 and 122.
224 [VOL. XX
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
even though such a charter provision were technically per-
missible under the statute, there is always the risk that
such action would run afoul of equitable limitations on
changes that can be imposed by the shareholders in control
through charter amendment."
Having considered majority control arrangements for
Subchapter S questions, let us turn briefly to the problems
involved in establishing a rule of unanimity for such ques-
tions. As has been pointed out,100 a rule of unanimity in this
area will usually be impractical and unsatisfactory. Yet
there may be situations where an arrangement based on
unanimous consent of the sharehloders is the only one
feasible. For instance, the corporation may have been origi-
nally organized on the understanding that all corporate
action would require unanimous consent. Or, some share-
holders may condition their original consent to the Sub-
chapter S election on the adoption of a rule of unanimity
for all subsequent Subchapter S decisions.
Designing an arrangement based on a rule of unanimity,
as compared with a majority control arrangement, involves
some new problems, while others remain the same, and
still others are eliminated. Since Subchapter S itself re-
quires formal consent by all shareholders to both election
and revocation, a rule of unanimity is already established;
but contractual arrangements are still needed to protect
against termination of the election by individual share-
holder action as well as by corporate action. Protection
from individual shareholder action can be obtained by the
same means used in majority control arrangements; that is,
through imposing restrictions on the transfer of shares.
Establishing a rule of unanimity, however, also requires
giving protection to the minority shareholders from termi-
nation of the election by the corporate management. In
theory, at least, equitable relief may be available to the
minority shareholders where the corporate management
has caused the termination of the election and it can be
See generally LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1959), 507-515.
Using a fairer pricing formula under the redemption provision than "ook
value" would improve the chances of the charter amendment withstanding
attack in a court of equity. In view of 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 10, the
argument can be made that as long as a minority can get "fair value" for
its stock, the minority should not be able successfully to challenge on
equitable grounds any charter amendment adopted by the majority. Against
the validity of a redemption provision so used, it may be argued that it
violates the "policy" of Subchapter S itself with its requirement of unani-
mous consent to a Subchapter S election (see text, supra, n. 72), and that
such an unusual amendment should not be sustained without the unani-
mous consent of the shareholders (see O'Nwu, 8upra, n. 83, § 3.77).
10 -See text, 8upra, p. 210.
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shown that they did so in flagrant disregard of the interests
of the minority. But the use of such a remedy is fraught
with difficulties.'
One relatively simple way to protect the minority from
the majority is to give each shareholder a veto power as a
part of the corporate structure itself. This can be achieved
by having the charter require unanimous consent for
both shareholder action and director action (each share-
holder would also be a director) .102 A less severe approach
would be to require unanimity only with respect to actions
that could result in termination of the election. This would
entail requiring unanimity as to issues of stock, transfers
of treasury stock, waiver of stock restrictions, and charter
amendment, combined with charter restrictions as to the
type of business activity so as to prevent termination be-
cause the gross receipts of the business are of an improper
type or source."3 Either of these approaches, however, in-
volves putting a straight-jacket on the majority share-
holders and the corporate management that would usually
cost more in loss of operating efficiency than the protection
given to the minority would be worth.
A more feasible way, perhaps, to guard against action
causing termination of the election instigated by the ma-
jority either as corporate managers or as individuals is
through use of a liquidated damage provision. Even though
a shareholders' agreement prohibited all the acts that
would cause termination of the election, still the equitable
remedies of specific performance and injunction would not
be effective, because there would be no way for the equity
court to nullify retroactively an act that caused the termi-
nation. Moreover, damages for breach of such a share-
holders' agreement would be virtually impossible to com-
pute. For example, suppose a minority shareholder were in
a 20% federal income tax bracket and the corporation
would have to pay a 52% corporate tax in the event of
termination of the election. Certainly termination in such
a situation significantly increases the tax burden on the
minority shareholder's share of the business profits. But
this example over-simplifies the problems involved in mea-
suring the injury to the minority shareholder. An accurate
measure of damages would involve not only the current
year but the indefinite future; and a number of factors
would be involved, all highly speculative, including the
'
01
'See text, supra, p. 216.
'0 See Roland Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Hendler, 206 Md. 10, 14,
109 A. 2d 753 (1954).
0 See 8upra, n. 13.
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future incomes of the shareholder and the corporation,
changes in the salary and distribution practices of the cor-
poration, and changes in the tax law itself. In view of the
difficulty of ascertaining damages, it would seem that a
liquidated damage provision that sought to make a reason-
able estimate of the damages would be sustained by the
courts, and not held to be a penalty. °4 Of course, the par-
ties would use such a provision in a shareholders' agree-
ment not in the expectation that it would have to be in-
voked, but in the hope that it would be a deterrent to acts
terminating the election. With these thoughts in mind, a
draft of a shareholders' agreement to establish a rule of
unanimity for Subchapter S questions is presented below:'
AGREEWENT m ade this ............ day of .......................... ,
1960, between Daniel Doe, Edward Engle, and Fred
Frame (hereinafter referred to as the Stockholders),
and Green, Inc., a Maryland corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the Corporation).
WHEREAS the Corporation has elected and the Stock-
holders have consented under Section 1372(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to tax treatment under
the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S);
and
WHEREAs the Stockholders desire that Subchapter S
tax treatment should not be terminated except with
the unanimous consent of the stockholders of the Cor-
poration;
Now THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed as follows:
1. (Same as section 1 of agreement on page 220)
2. (Same as section 2 of agreement on page 220)
3. (Same as section 3 of agreement on page 221)
4. No party hereto, either in his individual ca-
pacity, or as director, officer, or employee of the Cor-
poration, shall do, vote for, or assent to any act causing
the termination of Subchapter S tax treatment, unless
there is unanimous stockholder approval of such act
and termination. The failure to take action, reasonable
in the circumstances, that would have prevented a
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932), § 339; MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON TI E LAW OF DAMAGES (1935), Ch. 24.
103 See supra, n. 84.
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termination of Subchapter S tax treatment shall be
deemed assent to an act causing termination within
the meaning of the preceding sentence.10 6
5. Inasmuch as the remedy at law would be inade-
quate and inasmuch as it would be extremely difficult
to determine the actual damages resulting to parties
hereto should Subchapter S tax treatment be termi-
nated without unanimous consent of the stockholders,
any party hereto who fails to comply with the terms of
this agreement where such failure results in termina-
tion of Subchapter S tax treatment hereby agrees to
pay to each of those stockholders of the Corporation
who are not in default under this agreement (herein-
after referred to as complying stockholders) as liqui-
dated damages ten dollars ($10) times the number of
shares then owned by each such complying stock-
holder. If more than one party hereto fails to comply
with the terms of this agreement and thereby con-
tributes to the improper termination of Subchapter S
tax treatment, all such defaulting parties shall be
jointly and severally liable for the amount of liqui-
dated damages above specified. As between them-
selves, such defaulting parties shall contribute to the
satisfaction of such liability in proportion to the
maximum number of shares owned by each during the
six months period preceding the default.0 7
'0 Under this clause breach of the agreement results from acts of a
party taken in a corporate capacity as well as in an individual capacity,
and also from a failure to act to prevent termination in either capacities.
Thus, assenting to a failure of the corporation to exercise its option to
purchase stock when a transfer would result in termination, or negligently
allowing the corporation to exceed the 20% limit on personal holding com-
pany type income would be conduct constituting a breach of the agreement.
'0 As an illustration of how this clause is meant -to operate, assume A,
B, C, and D own 100 shares each in a Subchapter S corporation. B transfers
his 100 shares to E, and E fails to consent to the election. A and B are
directors and they fail to cause the corporation to exercise its right to
purchase B's shares. A, B, and E would be "defaulting parties" under this
clause, while C and D would be "complying stockholders". C and D would
be entitled to liquidated damages of $1,000 each. A, B, and E would each
be liable for the full $2,000 in damages, -and would each contribute $666.67
to the satisfaction of the liability. The $2,000 damage figure is, admittedly,
only a rough attempt to compensate the complying stockholders for their
loss resulting from termination of the election. In working out a proper
measure of damages, the chief factor is the difference between a stock-
holder's individual 'tax rate and the corporate tax rate. But even this is
just a beginning, for many imponderables are involved, such as the length
of time the corporation will be foreclosed from re-electing Subchapter S
tax treatment, the future changes in both the corporate and individual
tax rates, the future dividend policy of the corporation, and the possibility
of eventual liquidation. The formula used makes no attempt to relate the
amount of damages due each complying stockholder to his individual tax
situation, for the complexities are too formidable. One way to arrive at a
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6. (Same as section 8 of agreement on page 222)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, the undersigned, have
executed and sealed this agreement.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of Subchapter S, presumably with the
best of intentions to aid small businesses with their tax
problems, has, it is true, given the tax planner a helpful new
tool to use in certain relatively rare situations. But it has
also created a myriad of opportunities for abuse and a host
of difficult problems for the lawyer who seeks to mold the
relationships of the business owners so that they can live
peaceably within the framework of this new creature, the
Subchapter S corporation.
dollar amount per share to be used in the formula is to ascertain the dif-
ference between the average tax bracket of stockholders and the average
tax bracket of the corporation, and then multiply this difference (expressed
in terms of percentage) by the dollar value of a share of stock. For
example, if the average individual tax bracket were 30% and the average
corporate tax bracket were 50%, the corporate business income would be
worth 20% less to the average stockholder after termination of the elec-
tion than before; consequently his damage is roughly 20% of the value of
his stock. If, in this instance, the stock was worth $50 a share on the eve
of the execution of the agreement, liquidated damages of 20% times $50,
i.e., $10 per share, would be a suitable measure of damages to use. This
liquidated damage clause is, admittedly, a monstrosity, but at least it indi-
cates one possible approach to a very difficult problem.
